La historia, buen referente para los tiempos de crisis, informa nuestro presente desde esta experiencia. Este libro trata, en primer lugar, de la conexión entre el taller del historiador y la explicación de la historia: cómo se construye este saber. En segundo lugar se identifica a los agentes de la historia (personas, colectivos y fuerzas sociales) se rastrea cómo la producen y se diseña su desarrollo, desde los tiempos del arco y la flecha hasta los de internet. En fin, la (...) tercera de sus claves es tomarle el pulso a la historiografía desde la Antigüedad a nuestros días, incidiéndose en la crisis de certidumbres que desde los años setenta del siglo XX ha afectado a las humanidades y ciencias sociales y ha diversificado y enriquecido los enfoques de la historia social. (shrink)

Ya en su tesis doctoral, Malabou (1996) empieza a elaborar, a partir de una relectura de Hegel, una noción que recorrerá toda su obra: el concepto de “plasticidad”. En este artículo analizamos las principales apariciones de dicho concepto en los primeros trabajos de la autora francesa. En ella, dialoga especialmente, y de manera declarada, con Hegel, Heidegger y Derrida, prometiendo un concepto de la esencia o la forma que incorpore la diferencia sin negarla. Si bien el concepto de “plasticidad” en (...) la obra de Malabou ha sufrido un giro, según el cual ha entrado en un diálogo abierto con la biología y, más concretamente, con las neurociencias contemporáneas, en el presente artículo veremos su estatuto antes de dicho giro. (shrink)

Edició d'una important sèrie de treballs sobre el pensament i la literatura de Ramon Llull que es compten entre les peces fonamentals per a la moderna interpretació de Llull. La primera part recull íntegrament «El microcosmos lul lià», una obra ben coneguda.

Counterfactuals abound in science, especially when reasoning about and with models. This often requires entertaining counterfactual conditionals with nomologically or metaphysically impossible antecedents, namely, counternomics or counterpossibles. In this paper I defend the make-believe view of scientific counterfactuals, a naturalised fiction-based account of counterfactuals in science which provides a means to evaluate their meanings independently of the possibility of the states of affairs their antecedents describe, and under which they have non-trivial truth-values. Fiction is here understood as imagination (in contrast (...) with its most typical association with falsity), characterised as a propositional attitude of pretense or ‘make-believe’ (Walton 1990). The application of this theory to scientific counterfactuals makes their evaluation a game of make-believe: a counterfactual is (fictionally) true iff its antecedent and the rules of the game prescribe the imagining of its consequent (Kimpton-Nye 2020). The result is a practice-based account of counterfactuals and counterfactual reasoning in science which incorporates insights from theoretical and experimental analytic philosophy as well as cognitive science. This way, the make-believe view of scientific counterfactuals shows that the evaluation of scientific counterfactuals is none other than a question of scientific representation in disguise. (shrink)

Summary The aim of this paper is to analyse the scientific relations between Germany and Spain during the Entente Boycott (1919–1926) and the German academic policy that fostered it. The study of the international relations of German science during the 1920s has been carried out using as a basis the archives of scientific institutions. Personal initiatives by individual scientists to establish relations have therefore not been taken into account. The relations between the scientific communities of Germany and Spain during the (...) 1920s indicate the importance of such personal relationships and from their transcendence at a political level. They also offer an example of how political strategies could dictate the politics of academic recognition. This paper is based on the analysis of sources found at the Foreign Office Archives in Berlin. It gives us a clear idea about the role of scientific relationships between the two countries in shaping their scientific policies. (shrink)

The Second Taiwan IUD Follow-up Survey, reported on here, is a representative sample of all IUD acceptors in Taiwan up to the middle of 1966. The data show that 30 months after insertion, 36% of acceptors are continuing users, on a first segment basis, and that if reinsertions are taken into account, the proportion increases to 45%. Compared with extensive clinic data from the city of Taichung, the island-wide termination rates are about 5% higher at 30 months, for first segments, (...) but the all segment rates show little difference at this duration. (shrink)

In this article, I present in a systematic way Aristotle’s understanding of movement (kinêsis) as efficient cause in the Generation of Animals. This aspect of movement is not disclosed in the approach to movement as an incomplete activity in contrast to energeia, which has been extensively discussed in the literature. I explain in which sense movement is the efficient cause of generation and how this movement is related to the other factors, in particular the source of movement, the seminal fluid, (...) pneuma, and the vital heat, as well as to the form and the soul. The role of movement as efficient cause of generation shows how, for Aristotle, form and soul are inseparable from matter and movement in nature. Explaining the role of movement as efficient cause of generation also helps to make sense of the multiplicity of factors involved in the efficient causality of generation. The key to articulating these factors with one another is the identity of form of the generative movement, which is specifically the same in the source, in the tools, and in the substance that is coming into being. (shrink)

There are two different notions of seed at work in the Generation of Animals: seed as the spermatic residue, which concerns only the male and the female generative contributions, and seed as the kuêma and first mixture of the two generative contributions. The latter is a notion of seed common to plants and animals. The passage in GA I.18, 724b12–22 where Aristotle distinguishes between these two notions of seed has been mistakenly discredited as inauthentic or simply as irrelevant for understanding (...) the seeds of animals. On the other hand, recent studies have rather focused on the seed as spermatic residue, paying little attention to the notion of seed as kuêma. In this paper I defend the authenticity and relevance of this passage and show how understanding the notion of seed as kuêma is essential to have a complete picture of Aristotle’s account of seed. This common notion of seed makes sense of Aristotle’s otherwise puzzling use of the word “sperma” to designate the seeds of plants, the kuêma, the fertilized eggs, and the first mixture of the two generative contributions. It also proves helpful in determining what the word ‘sperma’ stands for in key passages, such as Metaph. IX.7. (shrink)

Vorwort der Herausgeber mit Schriftenverzeichnis Albert Mues - H. SEubert: Transzendentalphilosophie und Metaphysik heute. EIne Skizze - M. SCherbaum: Philosophie als Lebensform - oder: Die Krise des Nihilismus und die Validitat transzendentaler Argumentation. SYstematische Reflexionen zu Letztbegrundung, Grenze und Bedeutung von Philosophie - M. GErten: Der Charakter der Transzendentalphilosophie als fundamentaler Geltungsreflexion. HIstorische und systematische uberlegungen mit besonderem Blick auf den spaten Fichte - L. MOckl: Zur logischen Position der Hypothese - I. RAdrizzani: Die Zeitfiguration in der Transzendentalphilosophie. REinhard (...) Lauths Appositionslehre als Aktualisierung von Fichtes Zeitmodell - K. POllok: Kants Begriff der Normativitat im Kontext der fruhneuzeitlichen Philosophie - C. LOtz: Gewissen und Widerstand - M. FUchs: "Freiheit, die sich Dasein gibt". INdividuum und Staat bei Platon und Hegel - B. DIeckmann: Reich der Freiheit und Kreuzestheologie. OPfer bei Johann Gottlieb Fichte - W. KLausnitzer: Christentum versus Islam. uBerlegungen zum Thema der Gewalt in beiden Religionen - M. FAmula: Zwischen Grenzenlosigkeit und Ausgrenzung. LIebe als Kultivierungsprozess in Adalbert Stifters Brigitta. (shrink)

This book describes how medieval Jewish Bible scholars sought to answer the question of what is meant by the Angel’s message from God to Abraham: ‘Now I Know’, as written in Genesis 22 verse 12. It examines these scholars’ comments on the nineteen verses in Genesis that tell the story of Abraham’s readiness to sacrifice his own son Isaac, the Aqedat Yiṣḥaq. It explores the answers they found to the question of what, indeed, this story is trying to tell us. (...) Is it a drastic way to condemn the practice of child sacrifice? Does it call for replacing human sacrifices with animal sacrifices? Is it a trial by which the Almighty tests the fidelity of one of His followers? Or is it His way to show the world the nature of true belief? The book starts with an introduction to familiarize readers with the many and varied manifestations of the Aqedah theme in Jewish culture and with the developments of medieval Jewish Bible exegesis in general. Next, it offers translations and analyses of the classical medieval Jewish Bible commentaries that deal with the exegesis of Genesis 22, exploring the many angles from which the Aqedah story has been understood. No less than five centuries of medieval Aqedah exegesis are reviewed, from Saadya to Isaac Abrabanel. These texts from the commentaries are combined with hermeneutical key passages by Moses Maimonides, Joseph Ibn Kaspi, Ḥasdai Crescas, and others, which were familiar to the minds of the exegetes, or which, conversely, reflect the impact of biblical Aqedah exegesis on religious thought. Together, the passages discussed illustrate the growth and development of Jewish Bible exegesis in dialogue with the rabbinic sources and with the various trends of thought and theology of their times. The consistent focus on the Aqedah constitutes a unifying theme, while the insights presented here greatly advance our understanding of the various developments in medieval Jewish Bible exegesis. (shrink)

In Necessary Beings, Bob Hale addresses two questions: What is the source of necessity? What is the source of our knowledge of it? He offers novel responses to them in terms of the metaphysical notion of nature or, more familiarly, essence. In this paper, I address Hale’s response to the first question. My assessment is negative. I argue that his essentialist explanation of the source of necessity suffers from three significant shortcomings. First, Hale’s leading example of an essentialist explanation merely (...) asserts that the nature of an entity explains some necessity, but leaves unexplained how it does so. Second, his essentialist explanation of particular necessities introduces new necessities that remain unexplained. Third, Hale’s version of essentialism presupposes a controversial metaphysical theory of properties, for which he offers no defense. (shrink)

The Third Covenant explores the work of Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, Thomas Berry, and Albert LaChance, revealing through the lens of spirituality, science, and ecology, their understanding of human origin and evolution. Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, an early twentieth century geologist and priest, devoted his life as a scientist, clergyman, and mystic, to reuniting the artificial fracture between science and religion. Thomas Berry, a follower of Teilhard de Chardin and a highly respected cultural historian, furthered this reunification by repositioning (...) the human in the unfolding of an evolving universe, integrated and interdependent with the rest of the life systems of the planet. Albert LaChance, himself a six-year, face-to-face student of Berry, brought this new paradigm into his work as a poet, psychologist, addiction recovery professional, and most importantly, as a mystic and scholar of religion. Along with his daughter, Rebecca LaChance Goodwin, LaChance explores the development of this crucial shift in human understanding and its implications for the future. Parts I and II explore the elements of polarized thinking that makes us believe that we are separate from each other and the life systems of the planet. Thomas Berry's list of twelve principles for understanding the universe and the role of the human in the universe process describes the creative unfolding of our place in the universe. Part III introduces practical steps for achieving personal, familial, and cultural change. LaChance outlines his Twelve Steps of Ecological Spirituality to help us move from powerlessness and isolation to a state of reawakening to self, to humanity, to all species, to the planet, and to the universe. (shrink)

According to Aristotle’s homonymy principle, when we use a common name to refer to wholes and parts that lack the capacity to carry out the function signified by the name, we are using the name in a homonymous way. For example, pictures and statues of a man, or a dead eye, are called “man” and “eye” only homonymously because they cannot carry out their proper function, i.e., to live and to see. This principle serves well Aristotle’s purposes in natural philosophy, (...) for it avoids a reduction of the essence of living bodies and their parts to their material composition and shape. This principle, however, leaves unexplained why we still use those names in common language, despite their homonymy. Using Aristotle’s own comments on homonymy, I will examine the role played by external figure, for it explains why such homonyms are not accidental. In fact, they are correct forms of linguistic usage in non-philosophical contexts. (shrink)

How much by way of economic reward is due to health care providers?Although this problem usually presents itself as a practical matter of policy, it has buried within it a number of philosophical issues, for it can be regarded as a question in the theory of economic justice. The formal principle of justice is that we should render persons what is due to them. But on what consideration in the case of health care providers can we make an assessment of (...) what is due?The answer we give to this question has significant implications for the ethical appraisal of the allocation of resources in the health care system. Some of the most difficult issues of ethical appraisal emerge when we consider the problems of allocating potentially life-saving resources between different groups of patients. Many of the most significant current issues in medical ethics—the role of QALYs, the meaning of equality and the economic evaluation of life—find their point of reference in the ‘tragic choices’ that are created when there are insufficient resources to meet apparently legitimate medical need. Yet, as Robert Evans has pointed out, it is a simple matter of accounting identity that health care expenditures must equal health providers' incomes. So, in asking how we limit or allocate costly health care resources, we are implicitly offering an answer to the question of how much we should pay providers. I hope by seeking an answer explicitly to that question to throw light on the problems that are raised when considering ethically the allocation of health care resources. (shrink)

This is a complete exposition of a tight version of a fundamental theorem of computational complexity due to Levin: The inherent space complexity of any partial function is very accurately specifiable in a Π1 way, and every such specification that is even Σ2 does characterize the complexity of some partial function, even one that assumes only the values 0 and 1.

"I know of no safe repository of the utlimate power of society but the people. And if we think them not enlightened enough, the remedy is not to take power from them, but to inform them by education." Thomas Jefferson, 1820.

The scientific investigation of consciousness generates new findings at a rapid pace. We argue that we need a novel theoretical framework, which we call the ALARM theory of consciousness, in order to account for all central observations. According to this theory, we need to distinguish two levels of consciousness, namely basic arousal and general alertness. Basic arousal functions as a specific alarm system, keeping a biological organism alive under sudden intense threats, and general alertness enables flexible learning and behavioural strategies. (...) This two-level theory of consciousness helps us to account for (i) recent discoveries of subcortical brain activities with a central role of thalamic processes, (ii) observations of differences in the behavioural repertoire of non-human animals indicating two types of conscious experiences. Furthermore, the framework enables us (iii) to unify the neural evidence for the relevance of subcortical processes, on the one hand, and of cortico-cortical loops, on the other, and finally (iv) to clarify the evolutionary and actual functional role of conscious experiences. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Evolution of Pragmatism in India: Ambedkar, Dewey, and the Rhetoric of Reconstruction by Scott R. StroudAlbert R. SpencerBy Scott R. StroudThe Evolution of Pragmatism in India: Ambedkar, Dewey, and the Rhetoric of Reconstruction Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2023. 302 pp., incl. indexMore scholarly attention needs to be paid to the mutual influences between Asian and American thought, especially with regards to the development, (...) legacy, and future of pragmatism. Fortunately, there have been several notable attempts. Throughout his works, Richard Shusterman frequently incorporates the perspectives of various East Asian philosophies into his articulation of somaesthetics. Multiple scholars have explored John Dewey’s lectures in China and their political and educational impact, such as Jessica Ching-Sze Wang’s John Dewey in China or The Democracy of the Dead by Roger T. Ames and David L. Hall. Still others have highlighted the influence of Indian thought on pragmatism’s forerunners, such as American Philosophy Before Pragmatism (Goodman 2015), American Pragmatism: An Introduction (Spencer 2020), and The Ethics of Oneness (Engles 2021). Perhaps the most interesting inquiries into this influence can be found in a special volume of The Journal of Aesthetic Education (Vol. 43, No. 1) where multiple scholars discuss pragmatism’s connections and comparisons to The Bhagavad Gita, Confucianism, and Taoism. Among these scholars is Scott Stroud whose most recent publication The Evolution of Pragmatism in India (2023) represents the culmination of nearly two decades of research on the subject with special attention to the continuities between pragmatism and Indian thought. In it, he meticulously explores the influence of John Dewey on one of his students, Bhimrao Ambedkar (1891–1956), who was a transformative figure in the founding of the nascent Republic of India. The result is a work of scholarship that shows the global relevance of pragmatism in the 20th Century, [End Page 456] introduces the fascinating philosophy of Ambedkar to a non-Indian audience, and provides an entry for further scholarship on this profound thinker and activist.Bhimrao Ambedkar was a critical figure in the birth of modern India. Born an “untouchable” due to the rigid caste system, he tirelessly advocated for the right of Dalits (“crushed” or “untouchables”). By the mid-20th century, he had greatly influenced Indian politics, safeguarded the interests of the oppressed, and played a key role in drafting the Indian Constitution. Separate to his role as a statesman, Ambedkar promoted Buddhism in the 1950s as an escape from caste oppression, culminating in his publication, The Buddha and His Dhamma (1957). While his name is less familiar outside of India, he was voted the “Greatest Indian” in a 2012 poll due to his profound impact on the nation’s post-independence development. These accomplishments were supported by an extensive education, but unlike most subjects of the British Empire, Ambedkar also studied in the United States. Stroud initiates his study by focusing on this formative period, specifically his time at Columbia University and the influence of the philosopher and psychologist John Dewey. While their relationship has been acknowledged, Stroud is the first to explore this relationship in depth and he not only reconstructs the influence of Dewey on Ambedkar’s Navayana Pragmatism but illuminates the ways that Ambedkar integrated, modified, and even resisted Dewey’s pragmatism.Stroud masterfully builds his reconstruction of this synergy between Dewey’s pragmatism and Ambedkar’s philosophy not out of ephemeral conjecture or pithy textual evidence, but through painstaking, detailed, and exhaustive scholarship. He draws on comparative evidence in their major and minor works, their private correspondence, interviews of Ambedekar’s cohort at Columbia, Dewey’s voluminous lecture notes, and even the marginalia and notecards found between the pages of Ambedkar’s pragmatism bookshelf. Indeed, I often found myself pleasantly distracted as I imagined Stroud’s academic pilgrimage throughout India, Columbia University, and the Center for Dewey Studies to find every scrap of relevant information. In our age of instant information and digital archives, it is refreshing and inspiring to encounter a scholar still willing to trek across the globe for answers to his inquiries. Despite his passion to uncover the influence of Dewey on Ambedekar, Stroud never reduces the... (shrink)

In this paper, I critically assess different interpretations of Bohmian mechanics that are not committed to an ontology based on the wave function being an actual physical object that inhabits configuration space. More specifically, my aim is to explore the connection between the denial of configuration space realism and another interpretive debate that is specific to Bohmian mechanics: the quantum potential versus guidance approaches. Whereas defenders of the quantum potential approach to the theory claim that Bohmian mechanics is better formulated (...) as quasi-Newtonian, via the postulation of forces proportional to acceleration; advocates of the guidance approach defend the notion that the theory is essentially first-order and incorporates some concepts akin to those of Aristotelian physics. Here I analyze whether the desideratum of an interpretation of Bohmian mechanics that is both explanatorily adequate and not committed to configuration space realism favors one of these two approaches to the theory over the other. Contrary to some recent claims in the literature, I argue that the quasi-Newtonian approach based on the idea of a quantum potential does not come out the winner. (shrink)

In this paper we study the combined structure of the relations of theory-extension and interpretability between theories for the case of finitely axiomatised theories. We focus on two main questions. The first is definability of salient notions in terms of the structure. We show, for example, that local tolerance, locally faithful interpretability and the finite model property are definable over the structure. The second question is how to think about ‘good’ properties of theories that are independent of implementation details and (...) of ‘bad’ properties that do depend on implementation details. Our degree structure is suitable to study this contrast, since one of our basic relations, to wit theory-extension, is dependent on implementation details and the other relation, interpretability, is not. Nevertheless, we can define new good properties using bad ones. We introduce a new notion of sameness of theories i-bisimilarity that is second-order definable over our structure. We define a notion of goodness in terms of this relation. We call this notion being capital. We illustrate that some intuitively good properties, like being a complete theory, are not capital. (shrink)

The central result of this paper is the small‐is‐very‐small principle for restricted sequential theories. The principle says roughly that whenever the given theory shows that a definable property has a small witness, i.e., a witness in a sufficiently small definable cut, then it shows that the property has a very small witness: i.e., a witness below a given standard number. Which cuts are sufficiently small will depend on the complexity of the formula defining the property. We draw various consequences from (...) the central result. E.g., roughly speaking, (i) every restricted, recursively enumerable sequential theory has a finitely axiomatized extension that is conservative with respect to formulas of complexity ; (ii) every sequential model has, for any n, an extension that is elementary for formulas of complexity, in which the intersection of all definable cuts is the natural numbers; (iii) we have reflection for ‐sentences with sufficiently small witness in any consistent restricted theory U; (iv) suppose U is recursively enumerable and sequential. Suppose further that every recursively enumerable and sequential V that locally inteprets U, globally interprets U. Then, U is mutually globally interpretable with a finitely axiomatized sequential theory. The paper contains some careful groundwork developing partial satisfaction predicates in sequential theories for the complexity measure depth of quantifier alternations. (shrink)

My paper aims to outline the concept of the pathic foundation of political institutions. I depart from the observation of a lack of clarity concerning the resources of institutional stability in the work of Chantal Mouffe and the proponents of agonistic democracy. Drawing from the ideas of Claude Lefort and Carl von Clausewitz, I sketch the idea that the experience of confict itself generates the moral and epistemic groundings that legitimize and stabilize its institutional regulations. It is within the pathic (...) experience of exhaustion in the face of the results of escalating confict that a common ground of legitimacy is reached. The bulk of my paper is dedicated to the phenomenological analysis of the foundational pathic experience, of the pathic disposition of political subjectivity resulting from it, and of its institutional manifestations. (shrink)

The Internet has become a field of dragon teeth for a person’s identity. It has made it possible for your identity to be mistaken by a credit agency, spied on by the government, foolishly exposed by yourself, pilloried by an enemy, pounded by a bully, or stolen by a criminal. These harms to one’s integrity could be inflicted in the past, but information technology has multiplied and aggravated such injuries. They have not gone unnoticed and are widely bemoaned and discussed. (...) The government and private watchdogs are working to protect the identity of citizens though at least in the United States both the government and individuals all too often side with prosperity when it conflicts with privacy. Still, these information-technological threats to identity have been recognized and can be reasonably met through legislation, regulation, and discretion. There is another kind of danger to our identity that is more difficult to define and to meet, for it has no familiar predecessors, has no criminal aspects, and exhibits no sharp moral or cultural contours. Still that threat to our identity haunts us constantly and surfaces occasionally in conversations and the media. It makes us feel displaced, distracted, and fragmented at the very times when to all appearances we seem to be connected, busy, and energetic. At the same time, the culture of technology, and of information technology particularly, has opened up fields of diversity and contingency that invite us to comprehend our identities in newly responsible, intricate, and open-minded ways. (shrink)

This paper explores metaphilosophy’s role in pragmatism. It does so particularly in relation to pragmatism’s multiplying and competing forms (e.g. classical pragmatism, neo-pragmatism, analytic pragmatism, third-wave pragmatism, new pragmatism, etc.). Focusing on the most comprehensive treatment of metaphilosophy in pragmatism, that of Scott Aikin and Robert Talisse, I argue their attempt to turn pragmatism into a metaphilosophy is problematic. Using a “metaphilosophical minimalism” to address pragmatism’s tendency toward what they label an inward looking and dogmatic “insularity” and “triumphalism” – a (...) tendency that feeds competition among pragmatists – I charge displays that very tendency (it also leads to a regress). I then pivot to outline what I dub “eclectic pragmatism.” This pragmatism embraces the contemporary zeitgeist of the inclusionary, decentered “more.” It does so by abandoning competition over the singular, right form of pragmatism (and indeed philosophy). It embraces the “more,” but not because it is right (which would be an obvious contradiction). Rather, it embraces the “more” because it is “’satisfying.” Simply put, there is a metaphilosophy at work with eclectic pragmatism. It is a “naturalized metaphilosophy” where the “choice” for pragmatism, especially eclectic pragmatism, is seen to stem from psychological and sociological propensities not the necessity of long exalted “reason.”. (shrink)

In my paper, I develop a phenomenological and pragmatist reflection on the fragility of liberal democracy’s moral foundations in times of war. Following Judith Shklar’s conception of the “liberalism of fear”, the legitimacy of the liberal-democratic order is seen as grounded in experiences of suffering caused by political violence. It is also assumed that the liberalism of fear delivers an adequate conception of the normative foundations of the European project. With the help of phenomenologists such as Edmund Husserl, Maurice Merleau-Ponty (...) and Michel Henry, the paper ants to philosophically deepen the liberalism of fear by outlining a theory of “pathic evidence” as a normative foundation and the concept of a common “flesh of the political” as a shared moral sensitivity that sets boundaries to political conflict as well as the political imaginary, excluding what I call the production of “monumental meaning”. It then examines the question which political conditions are needed for this evidence to become a shared, communal criteria of ethical thought, and considers inner and outer challenges to the transmission and reproduction of this evidence in time, drawing especially on John Dewey’s ideas of democratic communication and social intelligence. In the current war, the following problem appears as crucial for the “soul” of European democracies which are confronted with the need to respond to Russia’s attack: How can a political morality grounded in pathic evidence be sustained, once it is challenged by an aggressor who, out of cultural and political reasons, shows a higher level of toleration towards violence? Besides aggression from an external foe, there are also temporal dynamics that further the loss of the inhibiting force of pathic evidence from the inside. As it shall be argued, boredom can be such a factor. The paper concludes by drawing conclusions for the current war in Ukraine. (shrink)